Showing posts with label materialism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label materialism. Show all posts

Friday, November 30, 2007

Reason as Evidence for God

I recently recommended Doug Wilson's book Persuasions: A Dream of Reason Meeting Unbelief, to someone in our church who was looking for apologetics reading. Unlike most books about the reasonableness of the Christian faith, this one is written as a narrative, reminiscent of John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress. Each chapter follows the main character, Evangelist, who, while on his way to the City, encounters travelers heading in the opposite direction toward the Abyss. Each traveler represents a non-Christian worldview or philosophy of life, and in the course of his exchanges with them, Evangelist both defends the Christian faith and identifies the problems with their alternative perspectives.

After reading the book, my friend shared his reactions via email. Overall, he was impressed by Wilson's argumentation and felt he did a very good job of substantively addressing important issues in relatively little space. My friend did, however, take issue with how Wilson, via Evangelist, addressed an atheist named Mark. My friend said:

With Mark, for the Evangelist to argue that reason, being a product of random forces, cannot be trusted, nor said to produce a "true" or "false" result is, while technically correct, not a very persuasive argument. It's possible that the chemical reactions resulting from random processes that Mark calls reason are really just random processes, but in the end, it doesn't matter in terms of whether the atheist should believe in God.

Since I devoted some time to responding to my friend's criticism, I thought I'd make my effort serve double duty by posting an edited excerpt of my reply below:

The argument from rationality for the existence of God is one that C. S. Lewis popularized in his book Miracles and that contemporary Christian philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and Victor Reppert (author of C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason and owner of a blog devoted to discussion of the argument) have advanced.

One has to keep in mind that the dispute between the atheist and the theist doesn't consist merely of disagreement about particular facts but is in actuality a clash of worldviews, systems of interpretation that rest on certain presuppositions about the nature of reality, the sources and scope of human knowledge, and ethics. All of these are intertwined and interrelated. What one believes in one area has consequences for another. For example, if I assume that reality consists exclusively of matter and material processes, a necessary consequent is that there are no such things as objectively existing moral truths. Likewise, claims to knowledge of moral absolutes would be inconsistent with the belief in such a universe. What the argument from reason asks is, given our belief that we are able to form true beliefs that correspond to the world outside our minds and that we are able to make reliable inferences and deductions, what kind of universe best accounts for or grounds these phenomena.

In Miracles, Lewis contrasts the naturalist and the supernaturalist. The former, he says, contends that reality is a closed system in which every state of affairs can be explained (at least in principle) in terms of some prior state of natural affairs. He writes (quotations are from the 1978, Collier Books paperback edition):

What the Naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can't go behind, is a vast process in space and time which is going on of its own accord. Inside that total system every particular event (such as your sitting reading this book) happens because some other event has happened; in the long run, because the Total Event is happening (6).

Lewis maintains that all that is necessary in order to demonstrate that naturalism is false is to identify something that operates independently of the system.

If Naturalism is to be accepted we have a right to demand that every single thing should be such that we see, in general, how it could be explained in terms of the Total System. If any one thing exists which is of such a kind that we see in advance the impossibility of ever giving it that kind of explanation, then Naturalism would be in ruins (12).

He then sets out to demonstrate how reason fits the bill as one phenomenon that cannot be accounted for in completely naturalistic terms and is therefore evidence that nature is not all that exists.

Lewis starts by stating that the possibility of knowledge and science depends on the validity of reasoning. When we use words like "therefore," "must be" and "since" with respect to beliefs of which we are certain, we are only correct to the extent that our beliefs actually correspond to what is the case outside our minds. "But if this certainty is merely a feeling in our own minds and not a genuine insight into realities beyond them -- if it merely represents the way our minds happen to work -- then we can have no knowledge" (14). He quotes J. B. S. Haldane: "If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms" (15).

Lewis proceeds by stating that in a sentence such as "Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday," the word "because" indicates a cause and effect relation. Eating the lobster had the effect of Grandfather being ill. In a sentence such as "Grandfather must be ill today because he hasn't got up yet" (and we know that he has characteristically been an early riser), "because" does not indicate cause and effect (not rising early isn't what caused Grandpa's sickness). Rather, "because" here indicates the reason for our belief that Grandpa isn't feeling well.

Lewis notes that this relation is what logicians call Ground and Consequent. According to a purely naturalistic or materialistic (in the philosophical sense) scheme, all our beliefs are simply physical events that are the effects of prior physical (and non-rational) causes. And, as Lewis points out, "a train of thought loses all rational credentials as soon as it can be shown to be wholly the result of non-rational causes" (26).


The argument from reason sets before us two sets of presuppositions and asks which set provides the necessary preconditions for what we all take for granted, namely the validity of reason and our ability to form true beliefs about the extra-mental world. On one hand there is the belief that mind and rationality emerged from non-rational material processes in which case our beliefs are not the results of processes of reasoning but are thrust upon us by our biology. On the other hand is the theistic presupposition that rationality has always existed and is ultimately behind life. The atheist rejects belief in the existence of God in the name of rationality and science. However, he or she holds to a worldview in terms of which rationality, logic, and knowledge are unintelligible. In his review of atheist Richard Dawkins's book The God Delusion, noted Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga offers a condensed version of the argument:

From a theistic point of view, we'd expect that our cognitive faculties would be (for the most part, and given certain qualifications and caveats) reliable. God has created us in his image, and an important part of our image bearing is our resembling him in being able to form true beliefs and achieve knowledge. But from a naturalist point of view the thought that our cognitive faculties are reliable (produce a preponderance of true beliefs) would be at best a naïve hope. The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.

If this is so, the naturalist has a defeater for the natural assumption that his cognitive faculties are reliable—a reason for rejecting that belief, for no longer holding it. (Example of a defeater: suppose someone once told me that you were born in Michigan and I believed her; but now I ask you, and you tell me you were born in Brazil. That gives me a defeater for my belief that you were born in Michigan.) And if he has a defeater for that belief, he also has a defeater for any belief that is a product of his cognitive faculties. But of course that would be all of his beliefs—including naturalism itself. So the naturalist has a defeater for naturalism; naturalism, therefore, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally believed.

The argument from reason is what is formally known as a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) argument that seeks to demonstrate the absurdity of a position when taken to its logical ends. It's somewhat of an involved argument but I think it's actually quite sound regardless of whether or not a particular person is persuaded by it.

Tuesday, January 23, 2007

Materialism, Materialism

When people use the word "materialism" they usually have one of two definitions in mind. Philosophically speaking, materialism is the belief that everything that exists is either composed of matter or dependent upon it for its existence. "Naturalism" is an equivalent term. Atheist and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins notes in his book The God Delusion that philosophers use "naturalist" as the opposite of "supernaturalist" and approvingly cites the following description of naturalistic philosophy offered by Julian Baggini in Atheism: A Very Short Introduction:
What most atheists do believe is that although there is only one kind of stuff in the universe and it is physical, out of this stuff comes minds, beauty, emotions, moral values - in short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human life (13,14).
Dawkins goes on to elaborate on the implications of this philosophy for our attempt to make sense of human cognition and affect:
Human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in this sense of philosophical naturalist is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no miracles - except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don't yet understand it and embrace it within the natural (14).
According to this perspective human beings are essentially physiological machines whose thoughts and behaviors are reducible to biochemical and electrical impulses. We are identical with our bodies. Consequently, if anything is wrong with us it must be biological for that is all we are. Imago Dei is a useless concept for making sense of ourselves. The images critical for interpreting our condition and what ails us are MRI's and PET scans.


"Materialism" is also used to refer to an approach to life that places premium value on the acquisition of material goods for the purpose of enhancing comfort, status, and/or pleasure. Gary DeLashmutt and Dennis McCallum define materialism as "...a subtle and sophisticated worldview that defines identity, fulfillment, significance, and security in terms of economics" (129). Obviously, one who is materialistic in this sense of the word may or may not be a materialist in the previously described sense. Both kinds of materialism are dehumanizing and destructive.

Because of my interest in counseling issues, I frequently consider how they converge in the pharmaceutical industry especially in that subset that manufactures psychoactive drugs. A naturalistic worldview prevails in contemporary approaches to enhancing mental health. It is a foregone conclusion that problems such as depression and social anxiety are the results of imbalanced brain chemicals despite the fact that there is a marked disparity between the evidence and claims made by the makers of the antidepressants marketed as treatments. This is where the second sense of materialism comes in. The drug companies have a vested interest in promoting and protecting a materialistic (the first sense) view of human nature to successfully market their products. Unfortunately, ample evidence exists to demonstrate that financial gain is often a greater priority for pharmaceutical companies than public health (see, for example, the following articles chronicling Eli Lilly's attempt to suppress links between its top-selling drug, Zyprexa, and diabetes: Eli Lilly Said to Play Down Risk of Top Pill, Playing Down the Risks of a Drug, Lilly Settles With 18,000 Over Zyprexa).


Despite the advances made in Christian worldview studies, it's frustrating that more is not being done in the area of mental health. I was heartened, therefore, when in a recent FRC briefing, Discovery Institute senior fellow Dr. John West made the connection between the materialist mindset and the treatment of children diagnosed with ADHD. While affirming that drugs might be a necessary part of treatment in some cases, he noted that the rush to administer them is an outworking of materialistic assumptions that may prove detrimental and unnecessary.

As we contend against the dehumanizing and culturally destructive consequences of naturalism with respect to such things as ethics, are we turning a blind eye to how we may have imbibed the very same philosophy in the garb of medical science?

Wednesday, January 10, 2007

In Recognition of Atheist Appreciation Week

Joe Carter has declared this Atheist Appreciation Week and is honoring the occasion with daily posts (start here) on his "favorite bizarre worldview."

I just started reading Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion and now there's question as to whether he even exists! (HT: Tom Gilson)

Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly recently did a story on the "new atheists." Read the transcript and/or view the segment here.

The Christian Science Monitor reports on how atheists are challenging the religious right.

Finally, as my own token of appreciation, below, I'm recycling one of my posts from two years ago called "I Believe in Matter Almighty."


******************

World Magazine's Marvin Olasky interviewed Alvin J. Schmidt, author of How Christianity Changed the World (originally published as Under the Influence). Responding to the question of how Christians can counter the widely held belief that Christianity and science are incompatible Schmidt says:

Alfred North Whitehead (a non-Christian philosopher of science) said that without Christianity's "insistence on the rationality of God" there would be no science. The first experimental scientists, beginning with the 13th century, were all confessing Christians (Roger Bacon, Occam, Francis Bacon, Kepler, Boyle, Simpson, Pasteur, etc.). They related their scientific findings to biblical theology. Not until the 18th century, when many scientists bowed to philosophical materialism, were Christianity and science defined as incompatible.
If Christians don't understand how to identify and refute the materialistic faith that underlies much of what goes by the name of science, we'll be running down a myriad of rabbit trails, arguing over particulars while overlooking core worldview considerations. As Phillip Johnson observes in The Right Question: Truth, Meaning & Public Debate: "Christians often think the controversy is primarily a dispute about scientific facts, and so they become trapped into arguing scientific details rather than concentrating on the fundamental assumptions that generate the evolutionary story."

Surprisingly, many adherents to the materialistic faith are ignorant of their faith commitments. They claim to be just following the facts wherever they lead, unencumbered by philosophical precommitments. This is why Cornelius Van Til insisted that one of the primary tasks of apologetics is to make unbelievers "epistemologically self-conscious," that is, aware of their own presuppositions about the nature and extent of knowledge.

The following online exchange with a self-professed "scientific materialist" (SM) illustrates the "faith" of a materialist at work:

KP: I've been thinking...although you say that you and other scientific materialists would willingly alter your position given enough counter evidence or the inability (in principle) of naturalism to account for observed phenomenon, haven't you really posed the issue in such a manner that it is practically unfalsifiable? I mean, at times you appeal to what you believe is evidence in favor of your position but when faced with information that appears to counter it, you can always retreat to the claim that a naturalistic, though currently unknown, explanation exists.

SM: I don't think so. Science has undergone some remarkable changes in thinking...from the Newtonian universe to the Einsteinian, for example...Paradigms change in response to an accumulation of evidence that cannot be explained under the present system, and which points to phenomenon outside the present knowledge.

KP: But again, I'm speaking specifically of the naturalistic presupposition. I still maintain that that is the most strongly held belief of contemporary science. I'm not denying that there are in the field of science. 

SM: Because there's nothing that has yet been unexplainable. I am not going to give up a system that works very well all over the place lightly or happily and certainly not unless there is positive evidence that falsifies it, or at least that points clearly to things beyond the paradigm. I think most scientists do indeed make naturalistic assumptions although the trend towards theories of information, complexity, and so forth makes the assumptions of today much less mechanistic and much less reductionist then has been the case in the past.

KP: You sometimes speak as though science and Christianity are incompatible. Why is that? I fail to see what it is about the Christian worldview that would make the scientific enterprise impossible. Science would "work" just as well under a Christian theistic framework.

SM: That's true. And that's why many scientists are able to maintain religious beliefs, often strongly held and sincere, from what I can see. The scientific method can be applied at work, without falsifying one's commitment to Christianity.

KP: Then it's kind of misleading to speak as though science only works well or even best with naturalistic assumptions.

SM: Ah...but one must make the assumptions of science in one's work, otherwise, one is doing something other then science. But science does not entail a set of ultimate commitments. Certainly, it does not need to. Anyone who can apply the standards and methods of their particular field can practice science. And, if they wish to have religious beliefs beyond that, I see no problem there. If religious beliefs determine the science, well, that is a problem.

KP: And is it a problem if science makes religious/theological assertions? And what do you mean by "the assumptions of science"? Is naturalism a necessary assumption for the application of the scientific method?

SM: If you make supernatural assumptions about things, your work won't go very far in modern science. What a person believes in their private, personal life is irrelevant to their science so long as it conforms to the standards of their field. If it does not, then their work will need to be good enough to overthrow the dominant paradigms or they will not get far.

KP: No doubt about that. If one adheres to a supernatural worldview, he/she won't go far in modern science because of the naturalistic bias. Those who are vocal about their religious convictions are ostracized as pseudo-scientists. There is an "in-house" pressure to conform to scientific materialism but this says nothing about the truth of that position. You see, what you're saying? You're saying that religion is to be privatized but has no bearing on anything beyond the subjective experience of the one who holds to a particular faith. 

SM: The difference between science and other fields of study is that science checks itself against an objective/physical reality which actually exists. The option to ignore someone because you do not like his views (i.e. if he is religiously inclined) is limited by the "reality check" function. If someone's science is good, it will win out...not necessarily at once, but it will win out in the end.

KP: I really don't understand you. You talk about this objective reality as though there is no interpretation involved on the part of those doing the observing. The naturalistic viewpoint is not the result of scientific inquiry unless of course one assumes it prior to making his observations. We're talking about the philosophical, non-empirically verified, assumptions that we bring to our experiences. Mind you, I'm not denying that there is an objective reality that exists apart from our minds. What I am saying is that this reality check you speak of seems to overlook the philosophical dimensions I'm speaking of.

SM: Science is not about ultimate commitments. It's a practical and opportunistic attempt to make descriptions and models of the world. I don't think practicing scientists worry much about the ultimate assumptions of science. The scientific method is really a method - a collection of methods, even and certainly not something to be seen as timeless truth.

KP: And again, your saying that science is different from all other disciplines in that it is referring to an objective reality is to again assume materialism, not conclude it. You assume that the ethicist is not dealing with an objective standard of ethics and that the theologian is not dealing with an objective reality because they are not dealing with physical entities.
That scientists may be unconscious about their ultimate commitments, is really "immaterial" (pun intended). The fact is that they have them and they make pronouncements about them that are received authoritatively. Sagan's comment that the cosmos is all that exists, all that ever existed, and all that will ever exist is not a scientific statement but a philosophical/religious one.

SM: That is definitely a philosophical comment on Sagan's part, perhaps an aesthetic observation even. Sagan was quite a romantic, and a bit of a dreamer. Many scientists are, in some sense. Physicists seem almost addicted to romanticizing their subject.

KP: Your original comment was not that science tests physical objects but rather that what distinguishes it from other studies is that it has an "objective reality" to check against. Do you see that you assume that objective reality = physical existence and physical existence alone? And that is not a scientific conclusion but an a priori.

SM: That's what distinguished it. Where is the physical or external reality against which ethics might check itself? Theology...metaphysics....I do think that the difference between such systems of knowing and scientific knowing is exactly that ability to check against a physical world which exists in and of itself. Whether there's a non-material "reality" somewhere is...well....it does not seem a useful postulate to me.
But we have already established that assumptions must be made before any investigation of any sort...certainly as true of theology, ethics, sociology, as it is of science. Perhaps...science simply concerns itself with things that can be checked against external physical reality?

KP: And are the assumptions of science themselves known scientifically?

SM: I would say that every time an airplane is able to take off the ground, the "materialist/naturalist" assumptions that went into designing that airplane are validated just a little bit more.

KP: And a theist could not have discovered and applied the laws of physics and aerodynamics without adopting a naturalistic worldview?

SM: I suspect a theist could have done so, but only up to a point. A theist, depending of the type of theistic beliefs we are talking about, would have no necessary reason to go beyond theistic assumptions about how nature works. As science has advanced, it has progressed towards greater and greater tendency to explain natural phenomenon in natural terms.

KP: Modern science was founded upon theistic presuppositions. Does that, according to your reasoning, validate theism?

SM: In fact, much of physics has been developed by theists, certainly classical physics. Modern science has been successful largely to the degree that it abandoned theistic assumption. Science was founded by theists but it was founded by people who looked to nature to validate their hypotheses.

KP: You're not making a very good case here. Of course a theist would have reason to explore the working of nature. That is exactly why modern science was born in the context of Christianity.

SM: Science has been successful largely because it abandoned theistic explanations and substituted explanations of natural phenomenon in natural terms.

KP: And what theistic assumptions are threats to the progress of science? One doesn't have to presume naturalism to look to nature to verify claims about nature. The theist isn't bound to deny the validity of empirically derived knowledge, is he?

SM: The power of scientific explanation has grown in almost direct proportion to the degree that the role of "god" as a practical explanation has declined.

KP: And is it conclusive that that growth is due to the abandonment of theism or could it not be the result of time? One doesn't want to commit the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.

SM: Conclusive? It is a pretty strong historical phenomenon. History does not generally provide "conclusive" proof of anything, but that doesn't at all mean that we can't understand what's going on. All history risks post hoc fallacies.

KP: Well, I think you're committing it now. You're saying that science has advanced BECAUSE theism has largely been abandoned and I don't think you can substantiate that claim. If what you are saying is true, we would not have expected science to have been founded by and flourishing among Christian theists.

SM: Really? How does theism yield knowledge of nature? If it's possible to invoke god at some point as an explanation, then why investigate at all? It seems to me that the history of science is a long and difficult attempt to overcome such thinking as applied to nature.

KP: Why investigate? Reformed theologians see the investigation and harnessing of nature as a fulfillment to the divine command to subdue the earth. Also, the classical theistic scientists set out to investigate the natural world because they believed that it was the product of a rational mind and therefore had an order to it. They also believed that we are created in the image of this God and therefore could, as Kepler said, "Think God's thoughts after Him". The idea that theism is somehow hostile to scientific inquiry is simply unsubstantiated.

SM: The association between declining use of theistic assumptions and rising explanatory power of scientific knowledge is clear. The matter of which is cause and which is effect, or whether there might be no association at all, is one of judgment, like most historical problems (at least those spanning such a long and complex period.) But is that not theism reflecting the influence of what are really non-theistic ways of seeing things? That's theism exhibiting some flexibility, which I certainly think is a good thing.

KP: You have consistently created a straw man of the theistic position and have sought to make Christian theism an enemy of real science. That's not so. Granted, there have been Christians who have been hostile to science but such a stance is in no way inherent within the Christian worldview. The Christian can only be said to be hostile to science unless one identifies science with naturalistic philosophy.

SM: If theism invokes supernatural explanations for natural phenomenon, I don't see how it can be accommodated in science.

KP: What non-theistic way of thought is that reflecting? 

SM: Any viewpoint that is bound up in revealed wisdom and absolute truth, which theism certainly is, is going to be very hard to reconcile with scientific exploration. The view that hypotheses should be checked against the world, and that when they conflict with revealed wisdom, revealed wisdom loses. I can't see the value of making supernatural assumptions about the universe. Where do such assumptions lead us? What kind of knowledge comes from them? How is it to be validated? That's pretty much all I'm saying.

KP: But why? You have yet to show any substantive conflict. And, as I've pointed out, if what you say is true, then science would have never been born in the bosom of Christianity. 

SM: I don't think I understand your point about the development of science from Christianity and I really don't think science was born in the bosom of Christianity at all. Seems to me that science came about despite massive and systematic resistance from orthodox Christian churches.

KP: This has been very stimulating and I appreciate your willingness to take this time with me. Right now, though, I have to go. I'd love to pick this up with you soon.

SM: OK...see you later. Have a good weekend, if i don't see you again.. : )

Monday, November 27, 2006

What's Wrong with a Child? The Tragic Consequences of Biopsychiatry's Naturalistic Worldview

The second in a series of articles the NY Times is doing about the increasing number of American children whose difficulties are diagnosed as serious mental disorders is entitled "What's Wrong with a Child? Psychiatrists Often Disagree." The piece could have been more accurately called "What's Wrong with Psychiatry?" for it dramatically illustrates the highly subjective nature of psychiatric diagnoses.


The article opens with an introduction to Paul Williams, a 13-year-old who "has had almost as many psychiatric diagnoses as birthdays."
The first psychiatrist he saw, at age 7, decided after a 20-minute visit that the boy was suffering from depression.
A grave looking child, quiet and instinctively suspicious of others, he looked depressed, said his mother, Kasan Williams. Yet it soon became clear that the boy was too restless, too explosive, to be suffering from chronic depression.
Paul was a gifted reader, curious, independent. But in fourth grade, after a screaming match with a school counselor, he walked out of the building and disappeared, riding the F train for most of the night through Brooklyn, alone, while his family searched frantically.
It was the second time in two years that he had disappeared for the night, and his mother was determined to find some answers, some guidance. What followed was a string of office visits with psychologists, social workers and psychiatrists. Each had an idea about what was wrong, and a specific diagnosis: “Compulsive tendencies,” one said. “Oppositional defiant disorder,” another concluded. Others said “pervasive developmental disorder,” or some combination. Each diagnosis was accompanied by a different regimen of drug treatments. By the time the boy turned 11, Ms. Williams said, the medical record had taken still another turn — to bipolar disorder — and with it a whole new set of drug prescriptions.
“Basically, they keep throwing things at us,” she said, “and nothing is really sticking.”
A caption beneath a photograph of Williams reads "In his short life, Paul has taken antidepressants, antipsychotic drugs, sleeping pills and so-called mood stabilizers." One can only wonder what such a combination of drugs is doing to this young man's developing central nervous system, not to mention other organs. Consider the fact that despite use of terms like "disorder," "diagnosis," and "illness" there are no medical tests for any of the conditions listed in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders and there is even further cause to question the wisdom of administering mind-altering drugs to children or, for that matter, adults to whom psychiatric diagnoses have been given.

According to Duke University professor of psychiatry and behavioral science, Dr. E. Jane Costello, psychiatry's system of diagnosis is "
still 200 to 300 years behind other branches of medicine." This assumes, of course, that psychiatry is a legitimate medical practice, lagging behind its elder siblings. But other than the fact that its practitioners are licensed physicians with the authority to prescribe medication, what is it that biological psychiatry has in common with other fields of medicine which do not rely solely on emotional and behavioral symptoms to determine the existence of disease? To what extent is biological psychiatry a medical science? These are questions that even those within the profession have asked. In his letter of resignation from the American Psychiatric Association, the late Dr. Loren Mosher wrote:
"Biologically based brain diseases" are certainly convenient for families and practitioners alike. It is no-fault insurance against personal responsibility. We are all just helplessly caught up in a swirl of brain pathology for which no one, except DNA, is responsible. Now, to begin with, anything that has an anatomically defined specific brain pathology becomes the province of neurology (syphilis is an excellent example). So, to be consistent with this "brain disease" view, all the major psychiatric disorders would become the territory of our neurologic colleagues. Without having surveyed them I believe they would eschew responsibility for these problematic individuals. However, consistency would demand our giving over "biologic brain diseases" to them. The fact that there is no evidence confirming the brain disease attribution is, at this point, irrelevant. What we are dealing with here is fashion, politics and money. This level of intellectual /scientific dishonesty is just too egregious for me to continue to support by my membership (emphasis in the original).
I realize that to many, the idea of questioning the validity of biopsychiatry is tantamount to rejecting heliocentricity but that is just a testimony to how successfully pharmaceutical companies have indoctrinated the public (and in many cases, general practitioners) with their reductionistic philosophy of human nature. In his book Let Them Eat Prozac: The Unhealthy Relationship Between the Pharmaceutical Industry and Depression (chapters from which can be read here), Dr. David Healy, notes that the class of antidepressants known as SSRI's (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) has "given rise to a new language in which we understand ourselves - a biobabble to replace the psychobabble of Freudian terms that so coloured our identities during the 20th century."

To borrow terminology from the sociology of knowledge, the drug companies, in concert with the psychiatric community, have been highly effective shapers of America's plausibility structure. Leslie Newbigin, in The Gospel in a Pluralist Society defines and describes plausibility structures as:

...patterns of belief and practice accepted within a given society, which determine which beliefs are plausible to its members and which are not. These plausibility structures are of course different at different times and places. Thus when, in any society, a belief is held to be "reasonable," this is a judgment made on the basis of the reigning plausibility structure.
Biological psychiatry, like counseling, is an inescapably hermeneutic exercise. The individual seeking to assist another in resolving intra-and/or interpersonal problems inevitably makes assessments and judgments about what is going on in the individual's life. These judgments assume a system of values and beliefs about human nature, motivation, and behavior.

Multiple interpretations can be offered to account for whatever emotional and behavioral symptoms an individual reports. Likewise, multiple conceptions of what is in need of being changed and how that is to be accomplished exist. Counseling and biopsychiatry, therefore, involve placing the counselee or patient in some larger contextual framework of meaning. In other words, all approaches to counseling and/or psychiatry seek to make sense of a person and his or her situations in terms of a broad interpretive framework or worldview. Given this fact, as well as the serious health risks associated with psychiatric medications, I'm dismayed by the relative absence of Christian leaders sounding cautions against psychiatric labeling and medicating.

Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Academic Doping: Success at What Cost?

Albert Mohler comments on a disturbing MSNBC report that caught my eye as well. It addresses a growing trend called "academic doping." Some parents are pressuring their teens' physicians to prescribe powerful stimulants used in the treatment of ADD/ADHD in order to enhance their academic performance - even when there's no reason to diagnose the kids with the condition.

As Dr. Mohler notes, this phenomenon involves numerous interwoven issues:

Some parents may want to blame a child's lack of academic performance on a medical condition. Others see the academic race for scholarships and college entry to be adequate reason to seek a chemical enhancement for their own kids. Parents of high achievers must wonder, "If he's doing this well without Ritalin, what could he do with it?" In any event, the promise takes the form of a pill.
We might be tempted to hastily dismiss Old Testament accounts of parents sacrificing their offspring to idols as the misguided acts of backward and primitive people. But in light of stories like this, it's apparent that we just have more sophisticated, socially acceptable, and protracted ways of killing our children to satisfy our hearts' desires (even if the object of our desire is their success).

Dr. Mohler poses the following questions to Christian parents:
How do we define success and achievement? Just what are our expectations for our kids? Are we really ready to put them on powerful stimulants, just to raise their grades and test scores? What are we teaching our kids when we do this?
These are all crucial queries but there is a more foundational issue that we should at least be willing to consider. To what degree have we thought critically about the philosophical underpinnings of biological psychiatry's claims? Ironically, while we are on one hand vehemently opposed to the dehumanizing and anti-biblical naturalism of Darwinian evolution, we seem all too ready to eat from its tree when it takes the form of materialistic psychiatry.

Increasingly, members of its own ranks are saying that the emperor has no clothes. Peter Breggin, for example, a psychiatrist who has been very critical about the over-prescribing of psychiatric medication and the pharmaceutical companies' marketing of disease in order to market their products, has called modern biological psychiatry "a materialistic religion masquerading as a science." Like the public at large, we have been well catechized (by means of pharmaceutical commercials and word of mouth) in the dogmas of "mental health." We
know for example, that depression is due to imbalanced brain chemistry despite the fact that this is a knowledge claim that even the drug companies do not make in the absence of scientific validation. We readily accept the myriad of diagnostic pronouncements based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as the authoritative declarations of "science" despite the fact that no medical tests exist for any of the close to 400 labels therein described.

Just yesterday I received in the mail a book that I only recently learned of though it has been in publication since 1999 - Unholy Madness: The Church's Surrender to Psychiatry. Its author, Dr. Seth Farber, was a practicing psychotherapist for 16 years after which time he left his profession because of what he considered irresolvable conflicts between Christian theology and what he calls the religion of psychiatry. I've only been able to read the introduction and portions of the conclusion (I couldn't resist skipping ahead) and I find myself in hearty agreement with most of what I've read, especially the following excerpt from the intro (Readers familiar with Nancy Pearcey's
Total Truth and/or Francis Schaeffer's works will recognize the underlying two-tier view of truth):
The church's surrender to psychiatry has been facilitated by its tendency to subject human life to an artificial compartmentalization: private versus public, spiritual versus political, otherworldly versus worldly. For too long the church has claimed the private, the spiritual and the otherworldly as its proper domain while allowing secular authorities to dominate the public, the political and the worldly.

Since the rise of modern psychology/psychiatry there has been yet a new compartmentalization: the spiritual versus the psychological. But there are no "psychological" needs or capacities that are not spiritual. By accepting this spurious bifurcation of the spiritual into the (secular) psychological and the (nonsecular) spiritual, the church has severely compromised its authority and enabled the practitioners of the idolatrous religion of mental health to promulgate their faith system and thus to gain control over the hearts and minds (and pocketbooks) of millions of Americans. I have attempted throughout this book to demonstrate that the rationale for this usurpation of power by the mental health professions and for the abdication of responsibility by the church is specious: mental health professionals do not possess highly specialized "scientific expertise" enabling them to uniquely minister to individuals' "psychological" needs (12).
The question remains whether the constellation of symptoms called ADD/ADHD constitutes a medical disease for which any child should be given potent stimulants with potentially hazardous side effects.

Tuesday, November 15, 2005

Mechanics, Scientists, and Intelligent Design

Today's New York Times has an interesting article in the Science section about the recent Kansas Board of Education decision to define science in such a way that it is not limited to naturalistic explanations. Prior to this the state's standards defined science as "a human activity of systematically seeking natural explanations for what we observe in the world around us" and restricted science to "explaining only the natural world, using only natural cause" because "science currently has no tools to test explanations using non-natural (such as supernatural) causes." The new definition calls science "a systematic method of continuing investigation that uses observation, hypothesis testing, measurement, experimentation, logical argument and theory building to lead to more adequate explanations of natural phenomena." 

According to the Times, the old definition reflects the traditional view of science that the political right now wants to change. However, David Wells's research of other states' educational standards (HT: Jason Engwer) reveals that Kansas was the only state to define science primarily as "seeking natural explanations." Wells says:
The definition of science in the current Kansas science standards is unlike any other in the U.S. By defining science first and foremost as "seeking natural explanations," the current standards subtly shift the emphasis in science education from the investigative process to the end result. This shift is out of step with modern science education, which gives priority to the activity of formulating and testing hypotheses."
As expected, the article contains a number of alarmist quotes from scientists desirous of defending the philosophical precommitment to naturalistic philosophy. A physics professor at the University of Kansas says, "The only reason to take out 'natural explanations' is if you want to open the door to supernatural explanations" and a Harvard professor of history of science says that the deletion of "natural explanations" means that now, "anything goes."

One comment that struck me as particularly interesting was that offered by Steven Weinberg, a physicist at the University of Texas. In support of understanding science as being confined to the search for natural explanations, Weinberg states that a scientist's seeking natural explanations is analogous to a mechanic who searches for mechanical reasons for a car's malfunctioning. I don't think this is a good analogy at all. First of all, an auto mechanic searches for mechanical problems because he or she knows how automobiles were created (or more appropriate for this discussion - "designed"). A mechanic is justified in restricting his search for answers to why a car isn't working to mechanical explanations because he knows that cars were built by other humans using mechanical principles. But in the case of the debate over the legitimacy of intelligent design theory, the question of origins is exactly what is at issue. Scientists are not justified in restricting themselves to natural explanations unless they, like the mechanic, know how the objects of their study were produced.

Thursday, September 29, 2005

Methodological Materialism & The Slippery Slope

Here are some excerpts from yet another post by Jonathan Witt:

The third morning of Kitzmiller vs. Dover found philosopher of science Robert Pennock testifying for the plaintiffs that science is a search for natural explanations of natural phenomena--a limitation known as methodological naturalism (or methodological materialism).
Pennock presented this as the definition of science, and said proponents of intelligent design are “trying to overturn" it, but later he conceded that there was a controversy among philosophers of science concerning whether methodological naturalism was essential to the definition of science.
Interestingly, Miller and Pennock each invoked a counterfactual in their defense of methodological materialism, so in the interest of aesthetic balance, let’s consider their argument. They said an omnipotent designer could have made the universe a few minutes ago and given us all false memories to make us think it was old. Thus, someone could entertain any sort of design scenario for anything and everything. But where would science be if everybody thought that way. The solution they offered? Methodological naturalism.
But this is the slippery slope fallacy: If we let a designing foot in the door, then before you know it our brains will turn to jelly and we’ll be invoking design at the least drop of a hat.
The best cure for one form of irrationality isn’t to flee into the opposite irrationality. The founders of modern science--e.g., Copernicus, Kepler, Newton--were open to evidence of design, and clearly their brains didn’t turn to jelly. Between the unreasonable extremes of hyper-skeptical illusionism on the one hand and unbending methodological materialism on the other lies the path of reason. One can remain open to the possibility of design and go right on being rational and measured, go right on looking hard for new and more elegant regularities in nature that were previously a mystery. In some cases, the researcher will do both at one and the same time, as when astrobiologist Guillermo Gonzalez and philosopher Jay Richards elucidated a cosmic correlation between habitability and discoverability, and from this inferred intelligent design.
Do yourself a favor and read the whole thing.

For an even more recent example of the slippery slope at work, check out this post by CelticBear, who accuses proponents of I.D. of "attacking natural sciences" and adds:
We already have a battle of pseudo-science in the public arena with crystals and ESP and UFO’s and Ouija boards and Tarot cards and astrology and other crap. Any of these things which base themselves on non-naturalistic concepts prove to advance science at all? Oh, how’s that Christian Science based belief of prayer is all you need working out? Save a lot of kids with leukemia has it? How’d you like to fly in a plane designed by someone who based his knowledge of aerodynamics on prayer? Or used Biblical knowledge to create an antibiotic? Or trusted in God to give him the knowledge to understand the effects of gravity, solar flares, cosmic radiation, and space vacuums when designing that spacecraft? If all knowledge should be revealed by God as it has been from 4000 BC, then there’s no reason to explore space at all in any case. Nothing out there that can’t be known through prayer and reading the Bible.

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

I.D. in the Morning

This morning's Good Morning America carried a bit piece on the court case over intelligent design in Dover, PA that reminded me of C. John Sommerville's book, How the News Makes Us Dumb: The Death of Wisdom in an Information Society. Television segments like this one simply can't get into the depth required to adequately address the issues at the heart of this case. Yet, millions will watch such snippets and come away feeling informed.

In the segment, a high school science teacher spouted the frequently-heard line about Intelligent Design being a clever disguise to get religion into the public schools. She looked into the camera and said very confidently, "In biology there is no alternative explanation to evolution." I think it would have been more accurate to say that there is no naturalistic alternative to evolution in biology but chances are that this woman has so identified science with philosophical materialism that she closes the door on any inference that doesn't fit into a materialistic scheme. 

The same GMA segment included an excerpt from an interview with the Discovery Institute's Vice President, Stephen Meyer, in which he was asked whether the think-tank's major donors are religious. As Meyer was about to answer, the voice of someone off-camera could be heard objecting to the question. According to Discovery Institute's Bob Crowther at Evolution News & Views, the reason for the interruption was that ABC had said that they wanted to talk about the Institute's position on education policy concerning the teaching of evolution and intelligent design. According to Crowther:
Just a couple questions in and the producers asked a question about how we felt about getting all our money from the religious right. I somehow doubt that what students will face in science class when they go back to school is a list of Discovery's funders. So an interview that was presented as being about education policy was a lie, a sham, a chance to get someone on camera and then ambush them with other issues. That's called bait and switch, and it isn't journalistically ethical in any way shape or form.
I agree with Crowther's assessment of this encounter as an instance of bait and switch. Unfortunately, what was aired gave the impression that the Discovery Institute has something to hide, the very thing that the reporter Dan Harris was insinuating and many others have charged. In my opinion, it would have been better if Dr. Meyer had calmly answered the question and pointed out that the issue of the Institute's funding is immaterial to the truth or falsity of the arguments they put forth in favor of intelligent design. Then again, there would be no guarantee that such a response wouldn't end up on the cutting room floor.

Thursday, April 14, 2005

I Believe in Matter Almighty

World Magazine's Marvin Olasky interviews Alvin J. Schmidt, author of How Christianity Changed the World (originally published as Under the Influence). Responding to the question of how Christians can counter the widely held belief that Christianity and science are incompatible Schmidt says:

Alfred North Whitehead (a non-Christian philosopher of science) said that without Christianity's "insistence on the rationality of God" there would be no science. The first experimental scientists, beginning with the 13th century, were all confessing Christians (Roger Bacon, Occam, Francis Bacon, Kepler, Boyle, Simpson, Pasteur, etc.). They related their scientific findings to biblical theology. Not until the 18th century, when many scientists bowed to philosophical materialism, were Christianity and science defined as incompatible.
If Christians don't understand how to identify and refute the materialistic faith that underlies much of what goes by the name of science, we'll be running down a myriad of rabbit trails, arguing over particulars while overlooking core worldview considerations. As Phillip Johnson observes in The Right Question: Truth, Meaning & Public Debate: "Christians often think the controversy is primarily a dispute about scientific facts, and so they become trapped into arguing scientific details rather than concentrating on the fundamental assumptions that generate the evolutionary story."

Surprisingly, many adherents to the materialistic faith are ignorant of their faith commitments. They claim to be just following the facts wherever they lead, unencumbered by philosophical precommitments. This is why Cornelius Van Til insisted that one of the primary tasks of apologetics is to make unbelievers "epistemologically self-conscious," that is, aware of their own presuppositions about the nature and extent of knowledge.

The following online exchange with a self-professed "scientific materialist" (SM) illustrates the "faith" of a materialist at work:

KP: I've been thinking...although you say that you and other scientific materialists would willingly alter your position given enough counter evidence or the inability (in principle) of naturalism to account for observed phenomenon, haven't you really posed the issue in such a manner that it is practically unfalsifiable? I mean, at times you appeal to what you believe is evidence in favor of your position but when faced with information that appears to counter it, you can always retreat to the claim that a naturalistic, though currently unknown, explanation exists.
SM: I don't think so. Science has undergone some remarkable changes in thinking...from the Newtonian universe to the Einsteinian, for example...Paradigms change in response to an accumulation of evidence that cannot be explained under the present system, and which points to phenomenon outside the present knowledge.
KP: But again, I'm speaking specifically of the naturalistic presupposition. I still maintain that that is the most strongly held belief of contemporary science. I'm not denying that there are in the field of science.
SM: Because there's nothing that has yet been unexplainable. I am not going to give up a system that works very well all over the place lightly or happily and certainly not unless there is positive evidence that falsifies it, or at least that points clearly to things beyond the paradigm. I think most scientists do indeed make naturalistic assumptions although the trend towards theories of information, complexity, and so forth makes the assumptions of today much less mechanistic and much less reductionist then has been the case in the past.
KP: You sometimes speak as though science and Christianity are incompatible. Why is that? I fail to see what it is about the Christian worldview that would make the scientific enterprise impossible. Science would "work" just as well under a Christian theistic framework.
SM: That's true. And that's why many scientists are able to maintain religious beliefs, often strongly held and sincere, from what I can see. The scientific method can be applied at work, without falsifying one's commitment to Christianity.
KP: Then it's kind of misleading to speak as though science only works well or even best with naturalistic assumptions.
SM: Ah...but one must make the assumptions of science in one's work, otherwise, one is doing something other then science. But science does not entail a set of ultimate commitments. Certainly, it does not need to. Anyone who can apply the standards and methods of their particular field can practice science. And, if they wish to have religious beliefs beyond that, I see no problem there. If religious beliefs determine the science, well, that is a problem.
KP: And is it a problem if science makes religious/theological assertions? And what do you mean by "the assumptions of science"? Is naturalism a necessary assumption for the application of the scientific method?
SM: If you make supernatural assumptions about things, your work won't go very far in modern science. What a person believes in their private, personal life is irrelevant to their science so long as it conforms to the standards of their field. If it does not, then their work will need to be good enough to overthrow the dominant paradigms or they will not get far.
KP: No doubt about that. If one adheres to a supernatural worldview, he/she won't go far in modern science because of the naturalistic bias. Those who are vocal about their religious convictions are ostracized as pseudo-scientists. There is an "in-house" pressure to conform to scientific materialism but this says nothing about the truth of that position. You see, what you're saying? You're saying that religion is to be privatized but has no bearing on anything beyond the subjective experience of the one who holds to a particular faith.
SM: The difference between science and other fields of study is that science checks itself against an objective/physical reality which actually exists. The option to ignore someone because you do not like his views (i.e. if he is religiously inclined) is limited by the "reality check" function. If someone's science is good, it will win out...not necessarily at once, but it will win out in the end.
KP: I really don't understand you. You talk about this objective reality as though there is no interpretation involved on the part of those doing the observing. The naturalistic viewpoint is not the result of scientific inquiry unless of course one assumes it prior to making his observations. We're talking about the philosophical, non-empirically verified, assumptions that we bring to our experiences. Mind you, I'm not denying that there is an objective reality that exists apart from our minds. What I am saying is that this reality check you speak of seems to overlook the philosophical dimensions I'm speaking of.
SM: Science is not about ultimate commitments. It's a practical and opportunistic attempt to make descriptions and models of the world. I don't think practicing scientists worry much about the ultimate assumptions of science. The scientific method is really a method - a collection of methods, even and certainly not something to be seen as timeless truth.
KP: And again, your saying that science is different from all other disciplines in that it is referring to an objective reality is to again assume materialism, not conclude it. You assume that the ethicist is not dealing with an objective standard of ethics and that the theologian is not dealing with an objective reality because they are not dealing with physical entities.
That scientists may be unconscious about their ultimate commitments, is really "immaterial" (pun intended). The fact is that they have them and they make pronouncements about them that are received authoritatively. Sagan's comment that the cosmos is all that exists, all that ever existed, and all that will ever exist is not a scientific statement but a philosophical/religious one.
SM: That is definitely a philosophical comment on Sagan's part, perhaps an aesthetic observation even. Sagan was quite a romantic, and a bit of a dreamer. Many scientists are, in some sense. Physicists seem almost addicted to romanticizing their subject.
KP: Your original comment was not that science tests physical objects but rather that what distinguishes it from other studies is that it has an "objective reality" to check against. Do you see that you assume that objective reality = physical existence and physical existence alone? And that is not a scientific conclusion but an a priori.
SM: That's what distinguished it. Where is the physical or external reality against which ethics might check itself? Theology...metaphysics....I do think that the difference between such systems of knowing and scientific knowing is exactly that ability to check against a physical world which exists in and of itself. Whether there's a non-material "reality" somewhere is...well....it does not seem a useful postulate to me.
But we have already established that assumptions must be made before any investigation of any sort...certainly as true of theology, ethics, sociology, as it is of science. Perhaps...science simply concerns itself with things that can be checked against external physical reality?
KP: And are the assumptions of science themselves known scientifically?
SM: I would say that every time an airplane is able to take off the ground, the "materialist/naturalist" assumptions that went into designing that airplane are validated just a little bit more.
KP: And a theist could not have discovered and applied the laws of physics and aerodynamics without adopting a naturalistic worldview?
SM: I suspect a theist could have done so, but only up to a point. A theist, depending of the type of theistic beliefs we are talking about, would have no necessary reason to go beyond theistic assumptions about how nature works. As science has advanced, it has progressed towards greater and greater tendency to explain natural phenomenon in natural terms.
KP: Modern science was founded upon theistic presuppositions. Does that, according to your reasoning, validate theism?
SM: In fact, much of physics has been developed by theists, certainly classical physics. Modern science has been successful largely to the degree that it abandoned theistic assumption. Science was founded by theists but it was founded by people who looked to nature to validate their hypotheses.
KP: You're not making a very good case here. Of course a theist would have reason to explore the working of nature. That is exactly why modern science was born in the context of Christianity.
SM: Science has been successful largely because it abandoned theistic explanations and substituted explanations of natural phenomenon in natural terms.
KP: And what theistic assumptions are threats to the progress of science? One doesn't have to presume naturalism to look to nature to verify claims about nature. The theist isn't bound to deny the validity of empirically derived knowledge, is he?
SM: The power of scientific explanation has grown in almost direct proportion to the degree that the role of "god" as a practical explanation has declined.
KP: And is it conclusive that that growth is due to the abandonment of theism or could it not be the result of time? One doesn't want to commit the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.
SM: Conclusive? It is a pretty strong historical phenomenon. History does not generally provide "conclusive" proof of anything, but that doesn't at all mean that we can't understand what's going on. All history risks post hoc fallacies.
KP: Well, I think you're committing it now. You're saying that science has advanced BECAUSE theism has largely been abandoned and I don't think you can substantiate that claim. If what you are saying is true, we would not have expected science to have been founded by and flourishing among Christian theists.
SM: Really? How does theism yield knowledge of nature? If it's possible to invoke god at some point as an explanation, then why investigate at all? It seems to me that the history of science is a long and difficult attempt to overcome such thinking as applied to nature.
KP: Why investigate? Reformed theologians see the investigation and harnessing of nature as a fulfillment to the divine command to subdue the earth. Also, the classical theistic scientists set out to investigate the natural world because they believed that it was the product of a rational mind and therefore had an order to it. They also believed that we are created in the image of this God and therefore could, as Kepler said, "Think God's thought's after Him". The idea that theism is somehow hostile to scientific inquiry is simply unsubstantiated.
SM: The association between declining use of theistic assumptions and rising explanatory power of scientific knowledge is clear. The matter of which is cause and which is effect, or whether there might be no association at all, is one of judgment, like most historical problems (at least those spanning such a long and complex period.) But is that not theism reflecting the influence of what are really non-theistic ways of seeing things? That's theism exhibiting some flexibility, which I certainly think is a good thing.
KP: You have consistently created a straw man of the theistic position and have sought to make Christian theism an enemy of real science. That's not so. Granted, there have been Christians who have been hostile to science but such a stance is in no way inherent within the Christian worldview. The Christian can only be said to be hostile to science unless one identifies science with naturalistic philosophy.
SM: If theism invokes supernatural explanations for natural phenomenon, I don't see how it can be accommodated in science.
KP: What non-theistic way of thought is that reflecting?
SM: Any viewpoint that is bound up in revealed wisdom and absolute truth, which theism certainly is, is going to be very hard to reconcile with scientific exploration. The view that hypotheses should be checked against the world, and that when they conflict with revealed wisdom, revealed wisdom loses. I can't see the value of making supernatural assumptions about the universe. Where do such assumptions lead us? What kind of knowledge comes from them? How is it to be validated? That's pretty much all I'm saying.
KP: But why? You have yet to show any substantive conflict. And, as I've pointed out, if what you say is true, then science would have never been born in the bosom of Christianity.
SM: I don't think I understand your point about the development of science from Christianity and I really don't think science was born in the bosom of Christianity at all. Seems to me that science came about despite massive and systematic resistance from orthodox Christian churches.
KP: This has been very stimulating and I appreciate your willingness to take this time with me. Right now, though, I have to go. I'd love to pick this up with you soon.
SM: OK...see you later. Have a good weekend, if i don't see you again.. : )