Some Things Never Change

From the archives of Techno Tuesday (HT: Question Technology)

Stand to Reason Videos

Stand to Reason has a library of short videos featuring Greg Koukl addressing various apologetic issues on YouTube.

Reason as Evidence for God

I recently recommended Doug Wilson's book Persuasions: A Dream of Reason Meeting Unbelief, to someone in our church who was looking for apologetics reading. Unlike most books about the reasonableness of the Christian faith, this one is written as a narrative, reminiscent of John Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress. Each chapter follows the main character, Evangelist, who, while on his way to the City, encounters travelers heading in the opposite direction toward the Abyss. Each traveler represents a non-Christian worldview or philosophy of life, and in the course of his exchanges with them, Evangelist both defends the Christian faith and identifies the problems with their alternative perspectives.

After reading the book, my friend shared his reactions via email. Overall, he was impressed by Wilson's argumentation and felt he did a very good job of substantively addressing important issues in relatively little space. My friend did, however, take issue with how Wilson, via Evangelist, addressed an atheist named Mark. My friend said:

With Mark, for the Evangelist to argue that reason, being a product of random forces, cannot be trusted, nor said to produce a "true" or "false" result is, while technically correct, not a very persuasive argument. It's possible that the chemical reactions resulting from random processes that Mark calls reason are really just random processes, but in the end, it doesn't matter in terms of whether the atheist should believe in God.

Since I devoted some time to responding to my friend's criticism, I thought I'd make my effort serve double duty by posting an edited excerpt of my reply below:

The argument from rationality for the existence of God is one that C. S. Lewis popularized in his book Miracles and that contemporary Christian philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and Victor Reppert (author of C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason and owner of a blog devoted to discussion of the argument) have advanced.

One has to keep in mind that the dispute between the atheist and the theist doesn't consist merely of disagreement about particular facts but is in actuality a clash of worldviews, systems of interpretation that rest on certain presuppositions about the nature of reality, the sources and scope of human knowledge, and ethics. All of these are intertwined and interrelated. What one believes in one area has consequences for another. For example, if I assume that reality consists exclusively of matter and material processes, a necessary consequent is that there are no such things as objectively existing moral truths. Likewise, claims to knowledge of moral absolutes would be inconsistent with the belief in such a universe. What the argument from reason asks is, given our belief that we are able to form true beliefs that correspond to the world outside our minds and that we are able to make reliable inferences and deductions, what kind of universe best accounts for or grounds these phenomena.

In Miracles, Lewis contrasts the naturalist and the supernaturalist. The former, he says, contends that reality is a closed system in which every state of affairs can be explained (at least in principle) in terms of some prior state of natural affairs. He writes (quotations are from the 1978, Collier Books paperback edition):

What the Naturalist believes is that the ultimate Fact, the thing you can't go behind, is a vast process in space and time which is going on of its own accord. Inside that total system every particular event (such as your sitting reading this book) happens because some other event has happened; in the long run, because the Total Event is happening (6).

Lewis maintains that all that is necessary in order to demonstrate that naturalism is false is to identify something that operates independently of the system.

If Naturalism is to be accepted we have a right to demand that every single thing should be such that we see, in general, how it could be explained in terms of the Total System. If any one thing exists which is of such a kind that we see in advance the impossibility of ever giving it that kind of explanation, then Naturalism would be in ruins (12).

He then sets out to demonstrate how reason fits the bill as one phenomenon that cannot be accounted for in completely naturalistic terms and is therefore evidence that nature is not all that exists.

Lewis starts by stating that the possibility of knowledge and science depends on the validity of reasoning. When we use words like "therefore," "must be" and "since" with respect to beliefs of which we are certain, we are only correct to the extent that our beliefs actually correspond to what is the case outside our minds. "But if this certainty is merely a feeling in our own minds and not a genuine insight into realities beyond them -- if it merely represents the way our minds happen to work -- then we can have no knowledge" (14). He quotes J. B. S. Haldane: "If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true...and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms" (15).

Lewis proceeds by stating that in a sentence such as "Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday," the word "because" indicates a cause and effect relation. Eating the lobster had the effect of Grandfather being ill. In a sentence such as "Grandfather must be ill today because he hasn't got up yet" (and we know that he has characteristically been an early riser), "because" does not indicate cause and effect (not rising early isn't what caused Grandpa's sickness). Rather, "because" here indicates the reason for our belief that Grandpa isn't feeling well.

Lewis notes that this relation is what logicians call Ground and Consequent. According to a purely naturalistic or materialistic (in the philosophical sense) scheme, all our beliefs are simply physical events that are the effects of prior physical (and non-rational) causes. And, as Lewis points out, "a train of thought loses all rational credentials as soon as it can be shown to be wholly the result of non-rational causes" (26).

The argument from reason sets before us two sets of presuppositions and asks which set provides the necessary preconditions for what we all take for granted, namely the validity of reason and our ability to form true beliefs about the extra-mental world. On one hand there is the belief that mind and rationality emerged from non-rational material processes in which case our beliefs are not the results of processes of reasoning but are thrust upon us by our biology. On the other hand is the theistic presupposition that rationality has always existed and is ultimately behind life. The atheist rejects belief in the existence of God in the name of rationality and science. However, he or she holds to a worldview in terms of which rationality, logic, and knowledge are unintelligible. In his review of atheist Richard Dawkins's book The God Delusion, noted Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga offers a condensed version of the argument:

From a theistic point of view, we'd expect that our cognitive faculties would be (for the most part, and given certain qualifications and caveats) reliable. God has created us in his image, and an important part of our image bearing is our resembling him in being able to form true beliefs and achieve knowledge. But from a naturalist point of view the thought that our cognitive faculties are reliable (produce a preponderance of true beliefs) would be at best a naïve hope. The naturalist can be reasonably sure that the neurophysiology underlying belief formation is adaptive, but nothing follows about the truth of the beliefs depending on that neurophysiology. In fact he'd have to hold that it is unlikely, given unguided evolution, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. It's as likely, given unguided evolution, that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.

If this is so, the naturalist has a defeater for the natural assumption that his cognitive faculties are reliable—a reason for rejecting that belief, for no longer holding it. (Example of a defeater: suppose someone once told me that you were born in Michigan and I believed her; but now I ask you, and you tell me you were born in Brazil. That gives me a defeater for my belief that you were born in Michigan.) And if he has a defeater for that belief, he also has a defeater for any belief that is a product of his cognitive faculties. But of course that would be all of his beliefs—including naturalism itself. So the naturalist has a defeater for naturalism; naturalism, therefore, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally believed.

The argument from reason is what is formally known as a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to absurdity) argument that seeks to demonstrate the absurdity of a position when taken to its logical ends. It's somewhat of an involved argument but I think it's actually quite sound regardless of whether or not a particular person is persuaded by it.

A Recent Discovery

Philosopher Victor Reppert, whose book, C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, I referred to two posts ago, has a blog appropriately called dangerous idea. (HT: The Stuff of Life)

Dawkins Talk Recap

For the sake of at least one inquirer and anyone else who's interested, I thought I'd give a brief report on how things went with the discussion of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion at our local public library almost two weeks ago. My friend and coworker, Tim Hunter, and I got the idea for the event while browsing a catalog from the library announcing various classes and lectures that would be offered as part of their adult programming. Seeing the variety of perspectives represented (a class on numerology especially caught our attention) prompted us to consider how we could utilize that forum to engage people in the community with a thoughtful Christian perspective. I frequently consider what the contemporary analogues to the first century marketplace are. In what public venues are people willing to hear and discuss ideas of great consequence? I think bookstores and libraries are natural answers because, for the most part, those who frequent them care about ideas.

Since Dawkins' book has proved to be of such great national interest (falling short of a year on the New York Times' bestseller list by only a week), it seemed a reasonable choice for a library event. Our intent was not to give a gospel presentation but rather to chip away at the plausibility of Dawkins' argument in hope of getting people to think critically about his position and, perhaps, to open lines of communication with people willing to discuss the issues further beyond the scheduled event.

Fifty-three people registered for the program though only about 50 showed up with 15 of that number being from our church. Prior to our getting started the library's coordinator of adult programming informed us that someone had called earlier that day complaining that the library was hosting such an event because "only one side would be presented." I was hoping that the caller would be there to offer an opposing viewpoint but if he or she did attend, they didn't offer any rebuttal to anything we offered by way of critique of Dawkins' position. Admittedly, we were slightly nervous about the potential of having hostile audience members but that wasn't the case. The conversation that did take place after our presentation, even with those who seemed sympathetic to Dawkins, was mutually respectful and enjoyable.

Making efficient use of the 90 minutes we were allotted was challenging. We wanted to allow adequate time for Q & A but we also had a lot of material to cover. We assumed that most of the people in attendance would not have read the book and that assumption proved correct. In our introductory remarks we noted that we were the kind of people that Richard Dawkins hopes would be converted to atheism upon completion of his book. We went on to explain that neither of us had such an epiphany as a result of reading The God Delusion but not for the reason Dawkins offers. According to him, "dyed-in-the-wool-faith-heads" are immune to reasoning on account of years of religious indoctrination including dire warnings to avoid "Satanic" books like his. Tim and I said that while we have arrived at a different conclusion than has Dawkins, we nevertheless are in agreement with him that the discussion of whether God exists is worthy of discussion in the public arena and are therefore grateful to him and the spate of atheist authors such as Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett, and Sam Harris who have helped bring the topic to the forefront of public discourse.

We went on to point out another area of agreement with Dawkins, namely that religious beliefs should not be afforded such a privileged status that their being questioned or critiqued is regarded as inherently offensive. We said that while we think that people should be treated respectfully, we think it's misguided to insist in the name of respect that we take a position that counts all religious beliefs as equally valid or true. We added that we think we should be able to argue the merits of various religious systems while being respectful of those with whom we disagree. As Christian theists, we are persuaded that Christianity is true just as adherents to other religious and/or philosophical beliefs regard their beliefs as true which means that regardless of our position, we consider beliefs that contradict those we hold to be true, to be false.

We spent a little over an hour giving a chapter by chapter overview of the book followed by our critique which concentrated on Dawkins' pre-scientific materialistic philosophy, his failure to distinguish between science and scientism, the inconsistency between his Darwinian account of morality and his repeatedly speaking like a moral realist or absolutist, and his failure to even acknowledge the theistic argument from rationality as presented by C. S. Lewis in Miracles and more recently by philosophers such as Victor Reppert in his C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason and Alvin Plantinga in numerous writings including his review of The God Delusion for Books & Culture.

By the time we got through our presentation we had about 25 minutes left for discussion during which time someone said that though Dawkins might overstate the case, he does have a valid point about the atrocities committed on account of religious beliefs. We responded that it is not religious belief per se that causes violence but rather what is believed that is the crucial issue. Another participant voiced frustration with every religion trying to prove that it's better than the others and made an appeal for tolerance. To this we reiterated that if we are to take religious claims seriously, we can't say that they're all accurate descriptions of God and the world regardless of the fact that they are, in many cases, mutually exclusive.

Following our presentation we had some opportunities to talk with a few folks who thanked us for our efforts. The library's program coordinator sent us a very encouraging letter of appreciation in which she reported that numerous patrons told her how much they enjoyed the event. This, along with the number of people who showed up, makes us optimistic about the potential for offering related talks in the near future. We've already started thinking about what other books we might use.

Helm's Deep

That's the name of philosopher and theologian Paul Helm's new blog where he will occasionally post papers that have been accepted for publication but have not yet been published.

Johannine vs. Postmodern Epistemology

Matt Harmon, Associate Professor of New Testament Studies at Grace Theological Seminary, looks at two aspects of knowing in 1 John, stresses the importance of keeping them together, and notes how a biblical understanding of knowledge differs from the postmodern construal:

1. Central to the Christian life is the "experiential" knowing of God, something not reducible to mere intellectual assent to a set of propositions.


2. Central to the Christian life is the cognitive knowing of certain propositional truths about God.


To be biblical, we must embrace both the experiential and cognitive aspects of knowledge. Losing sight of either of these realities results in a distorted view of Christian knowledge. This is important today especially in light of those who, enamored with postmodern critiques of intellectual hubris, wrongly claim that propositional knowledge must be jettisoned as a relic of modernity. Furthermore, note the confidence and certainty that John claims Christians have about the reality/truth of these claims. There is no hint of the false humility of postmodern culture that abandons certainty in the guise of humility. This of course does not mean that Christians have absolute or exhaustive knowledge of such matters, but it does mean that Christians can have sufficient knowledge for certainty on fundamental aspects of the Christian faith. At the same time, these observations also serve to correct those who in their pursuit of propositional truth lose sight of the experiential aspect of knowledge, thus reducing Christianity to a set of beliefs devoid of personal, experiential knowledge of God.

Read the whole thing

Herman Who?

Steve Bishop provides a brief biography of the Dutch Reformed philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd.

Making the Most of College

One of six suggestions to Christian college students at secular universities from philosopher Calvin Seerveld:

Find a group of kindred spirits with whom to read books of Christian philosophy together, any kind of communal deeper reflection on current problems, so that you exercise in community how to pin down the idolatries of our day in theory. We need to help one another detect ideas that lead thinking programs into dead ends, or unpack concepts that foster self-righteousness.

(HT: Steve Bishop)

Common Sense Counseling?

The class I'm leading through Nancy Pearcey's Total Truth recently covered the chapters describing the philosophical ethos of 19th century America and how it contributed to Christians embracing the idea of neutral (that is, free from all religious or philosophical biases) knowledge. Common Sense Realism, which began with Thomas Reid in Scotland, came to the U.S. where it thrived in academic circles, including theological education. Reid's thinking was prompted by the British empiricist skeptic, David Hume. Pearcey says,

....[Reid] aimed his own philosophical efforts at refuting Hume and formulating a new foundation for knowledge. The way to avoid skepticism, Reid proposed, is to realize that some knowledge is "self-evident"-that is, it is forced upon us simply by the way human nature is constituted. As a result, no one really doubts or denies it. It is part of immediate, undeniable experience.

Pearcey further explains the extent to which Reid's thinking was influenced by that of Francis Bacon who maintained that scientific progress required jettisoning all metaphysical precommitments and allowing the facts to simply speak for themselves. Scientific systems can then be constructed by reasoning inductively on the basis of what has been observed. According to this view, complete objectivity is both desirable and possible. But, as Pearcey notes, this insistence that one liberate himself from all philosophical traditions and systems in order to acquire knowledge is itself a philosophy. Failure to recognize this, however, made Christians reluctant to allow their biblical convictions to inform their thinking in fields outside of theology.

One consequence of adopting this model of knowing is that apologetics is necessarily prior to the doing of theology though not a theological task itself. Its purpose is to justify Christianity's claims according to allegedly neutral standards of reasoning. Only upon successful completion of this task is the theologian permitted to proceed. Writing in the early 20th century, B. B. Warfield wrote:

It thus lies in the very nature of apologetics as the fundamental department of theology, conceived as the science of God, that it should find its task in establishing the existence of a God who is capable of being known by man and who has made Himself known, not only in nature but in revelations of His grace to lost sinners, documented in the Christian Scriptures. When apologetics has placed these great facts in our hands-God, religion, revelation, Christianity, the Bible-and not till then are we prepared to go on and explicate the knowledge of God thus brought to us, trace the history of its workings in the world, systematize it, and propagate it in the world ("Apologetics" in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge).

I was reminded of this quote yesterday when I read this post by Tom Gee in which he delves into a subject that is of great interest to me-the subtle yet powerful absorption of psychological conceptual schemes such that the church's ability to think theologically about life and its problems is seriously impaired. Tom challenges the widely held view that some people have been so wounded by the sins of others that they stand in need of professional counseling before the ministry of the Word and the Spirit can take root in their lives and effect change.

If there is one area that Christians have been slow to recognize the crucial role presuppositions play in the formulation of theories, it is that of counseling. The thought that some wounds of the psyche require the application of extra-biblical knowledge so that the Word of God may find fertile soil jogged my thinking. Is there any connection between Warfield's conviction that supposedly unbiased science must grant permission for systematic theology to proceed and the popular assumption that "scientific" psychological counseling must, at least in some cases, pave the way for practical theology?

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